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INTRODUCTION  
When is reuse innovative, and when is it merely mimicry? What kinds of reuse 
are transformational and what kinds derivative? Laura Heymann tells us: It depends. 
Assessing the legitimate reuse of work depends on a range of parameters, including 
the nature of the original work, the creative expression of the authors (the original 
as well as the copiers and transformers), and the contexts of circulation and 
interpretation. This last element takes us into some deep waters. 
Heymann’s investigations into authorship, authenticity, and attribution begin 
from the literary theories of authorial context and reader response, but her argument 
ends up moving us far beyond a literary theoretical context. Simply put, Heymann 
argues that, in order to achieve a robust understanding of cultural citation, 
appropriation, parody, and other kinds of reuse, courts need to “situate themselves 
as part of an interpretive community.”1 Reminding us that any investigation of 
“transformative use” is always an interpretive exercise, and insisting on the 
irreducible historical, political, and social complexity of interpretive communities, 
Heymann sketches a far-reaching argument. Here, I attempt to follow her argument 
and find that it not only makes copyright litigation more onerous for courts, but 
leads us into difficult yet urgent political debates. 
Reasonable observers, Heymann argues, cannot simply be conjured out of 
judges’ common sense. Our notions of reason and common sense are embedded in 
histories of power. The very invisibility of those fields of power to many reasonable 
observers is a mark of its successful embedding in common sense, and a reminder 
 
1. Laura A. Heymann, Reasonable Appropriation and Reader Response, 9 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 343, 
365 (2019). 
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of the need to dis-embed its histories in order to enable a full interpretation. Thus, 
entering into an interpretive conversation plunges reasonable interpreters into a 
complex, interdisciplinary field, whose full understanding requires them to assess 
the meaning and implication of histories of colonialism, the politics of race and 
sexuality, and the changing political economy of music and art in a digital age. 
This is a tall order, but it is also a just one. Each of Heymann’s cases of cultural 
appropriation—familiar not just to legal scholars but to anyone who follows the 
cultural press—paints a picture of society that differs from idealized notions of a 
uniform social domain in which consensus is reached among rational actors. This is 
a society made up, not of atomized identical individuals who come to make claims 
in an abstract liberal domain of justice, but of impassioned actors in a field riven 
with power, politics, identity and history. We do not have a free market of formally 
equal voices and practices. Instead, we have a stratified, global field of sharing, 
copying, and reuse. Sharing, copying, and reuse are not just derivative acts; they are 
complex acts of creation that make up our collective public sphere as well as our 
individual subjectivities. To understand these processes fully, a reasonable observer 
would need to know more than a few disciplines. The observer would need to take 
seriously not just liberal theories of jurisprudence, but also political claims to 
reparation and justice, and radical demands for the correction of historical wrongs 
and structural inequalities. Herein lies the promise and the peril of Heymann’s 
recommendation. 
An interdisciplinary explosion transformed the Humanities and Social 
Sciences in the late twentieth century. Literary theory, influenced by continental 
philosophy, turned to political and historical analyses of interpretive communities 
in order to understand the meaning and impact of cultural texts. In an intellectual 
sense, this move seemed to be, in the late twentieth century, a historically 
responsible way to come to terms with the legacy of the Enlightenment.2 On the 
other hand, academia itself has proved unable to handle the pedagogical and 
political implications of this explosion.3 The Humanities have reached crisis point 
around some of the challenges of this interdisciplinarity: How should we teach 
students this messy domain of history and critique? How will we maintain rigor and 
method if we dissolve the walls between disciplines? Will this open-ness to the 
politics of the public not open us up, too, to the specters of extremism, partisanship, 
ideology, and conspiracy theory that lurk in the public domain? Humanities 
classrooms, while becoming more radically open to formerly disenfranchised voices 
 
2. JUDITH BUTLER, GIVING AN ACCOUNT OF ONESELF (2011); MAX HORKHEIMER & 
THEODOR W. ADORNO, DIALECTIC OF ENLIGHTENMENT: PHILOSOPHICAL FRAGMENTS (2016); 
JUST BEING DIFFICULT? ACADEMIC WRITING IN THE PUBLIC ARENA (Jonathan Culler & Kevin 
Lamb eds., 2003). 
3. ALLAN BLOOM, THE CLOSING OF THE AMERICAN MIND: HOW HIGHER EDUCATION HAS 
FAILED DEMOCRACY AND IMPOVERISHED THE SOULS OF TODAY’S STUDENTS (2012); Oliver 
Conolly & Bashshar Haydar, Literature, Politics, and Character, 32 PHIL. & LITERATURE 87 (2008); 
PAUL JAY, THE HUMANITIES “CRISIS” AND THE FUTURE OF LITERARY STUDIES (2014). 
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and radical arguments about liberalism, have also become the staging ground for 
some of the most difficult, often paralyzing, conflicts in the cultural sphere. If the 
most open-ended forms of academic experimentation have foundered on the rocks 
of interdisciplinary analysis, is it perhaps too much to expect courts, with their 
legacies of liberal jurisprudence as well as the inherently practical, time-bound 
nature of litigation, to enter this tangled domain? Heymann acknowledges that there 
is a high cost to opening up this conversation, in terms of the intellectual work and 
litigation time it would involve for courts to situate themselves as part of an 
interpretive community with all its tangled politics. Yet she sees this path as 
potentially leading to “the better outcome for the development of fair use 
doctrine.”4 
Laura Heymann’s paper is radical in its implications (although she presents it 
to us, via reader-response theory, in eminently reasonable, un-radicalized terms). 
We, her audience, are invited to be her reasonable reader. Yet, she raises, along with 
a range of rational, reasonable responses, the specter of unreason and passion. In 
other words, she opens the door to politics. How might we fully understand and 
adequately address the challenge Heymann articulates? 
Heymann’s challenges to common-sense interpretation and reasonable 
observers are embedded in what I would characterize as three insights about fair 
use. In addition to the judicious tracing of the specific content of use and its 
borrowings among particular individuals, courts will need to attend to three 
fundamental elements of the cultural landscape in which use occurs: (1) The act of 
copying is fundamental to creativity; (2) the constant operation of hegemony and 
power are fundamental to cultural practices; and (3) interpretive routes through the 
understanding of critical histories of power will be fundamental to future 
improvements in fair use doctrine. These are the insights I draw from Heymann’s 
analysis. Let us look briefly at the challenges each of these three observations 
presents. 
I. COPYING IS FUNDAMENTAL TO CREATIVITY 
Copying, as many commentators have noted, can be fundamental to creativity, 
cultural production, and even identity creation. Inherent in the fair use doctrine is 
the complicated, contingent right to copy. 
[C]opyright law gives authors certain exclusive rights to their work. These 
rights include the exclusive ability to reproduce or resell the work. 
However, the fair use doctrine, codified in federal law as 17 U.S. Code § 
107, is a defense that allows an “infringer” to make limited use of the 
original author’s work without asking permission.5 
 
4. Heymann, supra note 1, at 365. 
5. Fair Use: What Is Transformative, NOLO, https://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/fair-
use-what-transformative.html [https://perma.cc/DW36-CDWD] ( last visited Jan. 11, 2019) (a basic 
definition, from the Legal Encyclopedia). 
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How do commonsense uses of the terms copy versus innovate, borrow versus 
appropriate, and repeat versus interpret, indicate implicit hierarchies between those 
who create meaning and those who rip it off? Who copies? How, why, and where? 
Heymann reminds us that “the act of appropriation could itself have been seen as a 
communicative act,” bringing into our view the cultural practices of copying, 
commenting, mimicking and parodying in terms of a field of power that is drawn 
through long histories of race, colonization, and economic globalization.6 
Citing Olufunmilayo Arewa, Heymann dissects the ways in which political 
visibility and voice shape our labeling of copying practices. Privileged shapers of 
culture can depend on the historically circumscribed spaces of non-western cultures 
to enable their own practices, often collecting and curating “marginal” material, to 
appear innovative. Arewa argues, for example, that a “[l]ack of familiarity with 
African American music and culture in the broader American society has given 
collectors of such culture and other intermediaries tremendous power and latitude 
to curate cultural material.”7 Conversely, the 1937 version of “Loch Lomond” by 
African-American jazz vocalist Maxine Sullivan was called “sacrilegious” by a 
Detroit radio station manager because a disenfranchised population is not assumed 
to have rights to reinterpret or curate the culture of the mainstream.8 
In early 2018, a social media meme swept through Indian design blogs, 
referring to the European designer Christian Dior as “Unchristian Dior.”9 The 
meme, critical of cultural appropriation practices, originated from the studio of 
Indian artist Orijit Sen, highlighting the apparent theft of a fabric design by Dior. A 
Dior dress appeared to have copied a block print design from Sen’s own 
reinterpretation and recasting of Indian artisanal patterns. Although Orijit Sen is a 
well-known Indian artist and designer, his small business is not a capital-intensive 
operation, and the social media campaign could only bring a naming-and-shaming 
strategy to the controversy, since international litigation would be prohibitively 
expensive and time consuming. Reuse, appropriation, and copying by strong 
western state and market forces is an almost unstoppable problem, largely because 
of the historical and economic gulf between them and the developing world’s poor 
innovators. The Indian daily Mid-Day reported on his copyright-skepticism: 
Sen does not support the idea of copyrighting original designs to safeguard 
himself from plagiarism. “Art is the free-flowing exchange of ideas. Would 
 
6. Heymann, supra note 1, at 362. 
7. Olufunmilayo Arewa, Curation, Music, and Law 19 (Mar. 15, 2017) (manuscript),  
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2932520 [https://perma.cc/QNC7-597U]. 
8. PATRICK BURKE, COME IN AND HEAR THE TRUTH: JAZZ AND RACE ON 52ND STREET 99 
(2008) (cited in Heymann, supra note 1, at 361 n.104). 
9. Sreyoshi Guha, People Tree v. Dior: IP Infringement, Cultural Appropriation or Both?,  
SPICYIP, (Feb. 1, 2018), https://spicyip.com/2018/02/people-tree-v-dior-ip-infringement-cultural-
appropriation-or-both.html [https://perma.cc/FLU5-GWA6] (arguing that the issue highlights the 
“need to revisit the legal framework” of “Traditional Cultural Expression”) The Indian design studio 
‘People Tree’ reached an out-of-court settlement with Dior in May 2018, but a non-disclosure 
agreement restricts details. 
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I rather concern myself with protecting it? Instead of supporting and 
honouring Indian crafts and textiles, they [big labels] are feeding off our 
hard labour,” he said.10  
A Washington Post reporter noted the importance of Sen’s design work with 
traditional craftspeople, in which he brought original design elements and marketing 
contexts to their historical weaving, dyeing and printing skills: 
Sen said working with Indian artisans and reviving traditional crafts like 
blockprinting is at the heart of his work as an artist. His designs, he said, 
put a contemporary twist on traditional artworks so that artisans can 
remain relevant as fashion trends change. “This feels like a huge blow to 
the entire idea of supporting crafts,” he said. “Despite making huge profits, 
big fashion houses don’t think to give back anything. It’s a generally 
exploitative situation.11  
The ways in which individuals are figured as creators, authors, or innovators 
have much to do with their global location and their regional caste, class, and gender 
identities. As Indian craft ethnographer Annapurna Mamidipudi notes, “the 
handloom industry of India once ruled world markets.” But present-day global 
market paradigms make individual producers “disappear,” even while pushing 
design and production overhead costs “further down the value chain, marginalising 
the producer and recasting his [sic] image as ineffective, and an object of welfare[.]” 
(Mamidipudi 2006, p 3393).12 
When marginalized actors do not have the means to contest the terms under 
which copyright can be claimed and defended, they often look to the grey zones of 
copyright infringement and illegal copying. In resistance to the structural unfairness 
of western intellectual property regimes, many Global South scholars have studied 
the ways in which “Third World” actors deploy piracy and un-authorized copying 
as a “postcolonial tactic” to reappropriate cultural products.13 In these studies, 
copying (in fair, and sometimes illegal, reuse) is understood as fundamental to the 
ways in which developing countries, low-bandwidth populations, the poor and 
digital-divide-excluded, have participated in and caught up with, or leapfrogged 
over, gaps or inequities. They appropriate cultural and technological resources as 
part of the process of becoming part of the global economy. Scholars in the field 
of “postcolonial piracy” argue that this is justified because of the history of 
appropriation of Global South resources by colonizing powers. 
 
10. Shweta Shiware, Did Dior Lift Sonam Kapoor Dress Print from Indian Design Studio?,  
MID-DAY.COM ( Jan. 24, 2018, 8:40 AM), https://www.mid-day.com/articles/did-dior-lift-sonam-
kapoor-dress-print-from-indian-design-studio/18970195 [https://perma.cc/69LE-7YG5]. 
11. Vidhi Doshi, Where Have I Seen That Dress Before? Indian Designer Accuses Christian Dior 
of Stealing His Ideas, Feb. 1, 2018, WASH. POST, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
worldviews/wp/2018/02/01/where-have-i-seen-that-dress-before-indian-designer-accuses-christian-
dior-of-stealing-his-ideas/?utm_term=.0955b92283de [https://perma.cc/P5FC-4CQC]. 
12. Annapurna Mamidipudi, Transitioning Markets: Transcending Consumption, 41 ECON. & 
POL. WKLY. 3388, 3393 (2006). 
13. POSTCOLONIAL PIRACY (Anja Schwarz & Lars Eckstein eds., 2010). 
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Without getting into the weeds with advocates of “postcolonial piracy,” we 
can see that political communities of interpretation around cultural authorship and 
its historical contexts are attempting to reframe debates over creative reuse and 
legitimate authorship.14 Many Global South actors see well-intentioned Global 
North legal regimes for author-protection and design-oriented marketing as simply 
perpetuating historical injustices. The structural problems to recognizing authorship 
and creativity in areas distant from advanced market centers lead some actors to 
lose trust in the legal system, and instead pursue a range of semi-legal modes of 
resistance to copyright. Illegal copying is today not simply a marginal aberration in 
an otherwise fair landscape of reuse; the practice of copying in all its forms, legal 
and illegal, is a fundamental element in the landscape of cultural production. Legal 
fair use and its cousin, illegal copying, thus, do not stand in opposition to each other 
in practice, but develop in tandem, imbricated with each other, connected by 
structural and historical elements that are often invisible to courts. Although the 
study of piracy has generated a large scholarly interpretive community,15 courts do 
not have an easy way to consider such historical arguments in actual litigation. 
Translation work—from academic theory and digital-activist practice to legal 
discourse and back—could address this gap, if an interdisciplinary interpretive 
community were to grow in this area. 
II. HEGEMONY AND POWER ARE FUNDAMENTAL TO CULTURAL PRACTICE 
In 2LiveCrew’s ‘rap translation’ of Pretty Woman, in Coco Fusco’s defense of 
abstraction in artist Dana Schutz’s controversial Emmett Till piece, and in Madhavi 
Sunder’s work on the economic force of the public domain with respect to 
traditional knowledge, race, gender, sexuality, and histories of socioeconomic 
inequality play a major role in the shaping of interpretive communities of creation 
and reuse. All this evidence suggests that hegemony and power are fundamental to 
the cultural domains in which fair use is practiced and legislated. Laura Heyman’s 
own previous work on the reasonable observer, in which she critiques the 
conception of “the reader” as “a unitary being, with no gender, race, sexuality or 
class” raises quite explicitly the problem of claiming a false universalism to a 
particular voice. 
To adequately address the broader challenge posed here, we would have to 
follow conflicts over cultural resources to the political and economic system 
 
14. LAWRENCE LIANG ET AL., INVISIBLE LIBRARIES (2014). 
15. See, e.g., PAT CHOATE, HOT PROPERTY: THE STEALING OF IDEAS IN AN AGE OF 
GLOBALIZATION (2005); ADRIAN JOHNS, PIRACY: THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY WARS FROM 
GUTENBERG TO GATES (2010); BRIAN LARKIN, SIGNAL AND NOISE: MEDIA, INFRASTRUCTURE, 
AND URBAN CULTURE IN NIGERIA (2008); MEDIA PIRACY IN EMERGING ECONOMIES ( Joe 
Karaganis ed., 2011); RAVI SUNDARAM, PIRATE MODERNITY: DELHI’S MEDIA URBANISM (Routledge 
2009); Lawrence Liang, Porous Legalities and Avenues of Participation, in SARAI READER 05: BARE ACTS 
(Monica Narula, Shuddhabrata Sengupta, Jeebesh Bagchi & Geert Lovink eds., 2005); Kavita  
Philip, What Is a Technological Author? The Pirate Function and Intellectual Property, 8 POSTCOLONIAL 
STUD. 199 (2005). 
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through which they come to be shared. In an important article on the public 
domain, Anupam Chander and Madhavi Sunder observe that “[t]he unequal tilt in 
the public domain’s exploitation follows naturally from the dynamics of production 
and commerce in a world characterized by deep inequality.”16  
Conceptually related to legal debates over fair use in the cultural domain, but 
rarely cited by the same sets of scholars, are the global issues of intellectual property 
rights and patents applied to natural resources, medicines, and digital products. 
Following Heymann’s theoretical critique of false universalisms would take us, 
again, to a domain that appears fuzzy for those concerned with the immediate needs 
of legislative debates, but that we would have to enter in order to fully understand 
the structural issues at stake. Below, I draw a brief example from the patent debate 
in South Asia to illustrate the argument about universalisms, and to draw an analogy 
to the conversation Heymann wishes to shape, about copying, fair use, and 
appropriation. 
Looking at the last three decades of debate over intellectual property rights to 
agrarian resources, a couple of useful points of comparison emerge. As globalization 
was radically changing intellectual property assumptions in the 1990s, many 
Southern scholars critiqued the Lockean assumptions about the ownership and 
improvement of property to be implicit in what they saw as a new Global North 
insistence on tying together property rights, free markets, and economic progress. 
Implicit in Southern states’ opposition to patent claims on their natural and cultural 
resources, were claims about the historical misunderstandings of native peoples as 
poor stewards or non-improvers of property. 
U.S. patenting of modified strains of basmati rice, for example, was publicly 
justified by gesturing toward the assumption that private capital can be spurred to 
continual innovation only if it is awarded the rights of exclusive ownership of and 
profits from the physical and intellectual labor expended on its products. The 
Indian contestation of this and similar patents was based, most simply, on the claim 
that the modified strains were neither novel nor non-obvious. Until the early 2000s, 
the Indian Patents Act had specifically excluded agricultural and pharmaceutical 
inventions from patentability; the new intellectual property regimes put into place 
after the WTO agreements fundamentally challenged this patent policy.17 But most 
 
16. Anupam Chander & Madhavi Sunder, The Romance of the Public Domain, 92  
CAL. L. REV. 1331, 1373 (2004). 
17. The Patents Act, No. 39 of 1970, § 3(h), § 3(i), INDIA CODE (1970) (excluding from 
patenting “any process for the medicinal, surgical, curative, prophylactic, diagnostic, therapeutic or 
other treatment of human beings or any process for a similar treatment of animals or plants to render 
them free of disease or to increase their economic value or that of their products” and later modified 
under pressure from international financial institutions and WTO member-nations); see also Yogesh  
Pai, Yogesh Pai, National Law University, Delhi, HIGH LEVEL PANEL ON ACCESS TO MEDICINES, 
http://www.unsgaccessmeds.org/inbox/2016/2/29/yogesh-pai [https://perma.cc/V75U-F8R7] 
( last visited Jan. 11, 2019) (noting at the conclusion of the United Nations Secretary General’s High 
Level Panel on Access to Medicines that “India’s approach towards balancing patent rights and public 
interest is not divorced from procedural fairness,” that “India is among the few countries which allow 
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profoundly, a Southern activist argument rested on a premise of historical 
accountability and the right to demand reparations for past injustices. This historical 
argument, most commonly articulated by agrarian activists and radical anti-IP 
scholars, suggested that the North had achieved access to the South’s raw 
material—indigenous basmati strains, developed by Indian farmers over centuries 
of experiments in plant breeding—only by virtue of the force of arms and the power 
of a colonial state that had, centuries earlier, postulated inherent native laziness and 
indigenous incapacity to productively “improve” nature. Embedded in this debate, 
then, were historical questions about power and ideology—questions that the law 
was ill equipped to handle.18 Hence the frequent irruptions of this debate on the 
street through the 1990s. 
When history, inequality, and power undergird cultural practices, and when 
new political economic regimes are being put in place that build on these historical 
structures, it is inevitable that people will take to the streets if they feel that courts 
and states have rendered them voiceless. Their modes of articulation lie, technically 
speaking, outside the specific legislative problems we are focused on. The only way 
to hear their critiques is by enlarging our framework from the constitution of 
interpretive communities to the historical constitution of political communities. 
Although this is a messy prospect, such an effort might help initiate the robust 
conversation Heymann calls for. 
III. CRITICAL HISTORIES ARE FUNDAMENTAL TO IMPROVING FAIR USE 
DOCTRINE 
Heymann insists that we see critical, historical, political arguments not as 
marginal, ideological chatter on the edges of rational legal discourse, but as 
interpretive claims central to the ways in which fair use and copyright law are 
currently conceived, and as crucial conversations whose outcomes will be crucial to 
the shape of future litigation. 
Heymann also argues that courts need to situate themselves as part of an 
interpretive community. She calls for a conversation and acknowledges that the 
costs of this difficult process are not hers to bear. Scholars and courts alike might 
need to think more deeply about those costs. Who bears them? What are the modes 
and practices that such a “situating” might call for? 
 
both pre-grant and post-grant opposition,” and that “[t]hese provisions provide broad standing for 
interested parties, including public health groups”). 
18. Mark W. Janis, Book Reviews, 6 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 355, 357–58 (1983) (quoting 
MOHAMMED BEDJAOUI, TOWARDS A NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER 127 (1999)) 
(discussing that these histories, along with the popular and activist opposition to globalization, do 
indeed have implications for international law; in other words, historical claims about power can affect 
the practice of law, and Mohammed Bedjaoui, a former President of the International Court of  
Justice, called earlier in the twentieth century for a revolution in international law that would give 
prominence to “the principle of equity (which corrects inequalities) . . . [and its objective would be] 
reducing, and . . . even eradicating the gap that exists between a minority of rich nations and a majority 
of poor nations”). 
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Feminists and postcolonial scholars, on whom Heymann draws, have offered 
critiques of reader response theory that takes it to complex, critical, productive 
debates. But this critical space is politically fraught. Its terrain emerges by fusing 
advocacy, activism, politics and the production of knowledge and truth itself. When 
we think of how to read Maxine Sullivan’s appropriation of Loch Lomond as 
different from Dana Schutz’s or Prince’s alleged de-humanization of their subjects, 
we bring our prior political histories and convictions to these stories. We bring an 
impure mix of identifications, nationalism, particular and universalist, humanist or 
anti-humanist commitments to it. This becomes a critical historical engagement. 
Thus, engagement with critical histories is fundamental to becoming a member of 
these interpretive communities. 
Heymann’s path would necessitate some breaking of the walls between 
disciplinary reading practices. Some of these walls were erected in the eighteenth 
century partially in attempt to quell and contain precisely these seemingly 
unreasonable specters that lurked in the popular public sphere. The early twenty-
first century is a particularly fraught time to break down these walls and usher in 
the diversity of thought that flourished in the late twentieth century. On one hand, 
post-humanist academics have explored the productive use of destabilizing 
traditional liberal thought, via the expansion of critical theory and decolonizing 
epistemologies. The implications of their work include the possibility that our liberal 
notions of jurisprudence are built on unacknowledged privilege and partial 
perspectives. On the other hand, the rise of populism and nationalism in Europe, 
Asia, and North America suggests a majoritarian move toward closure, and a fear 
of destabilization rather than an opening up of cultural discourse. As conservative 
news anchor Tucker Carlson exclaimed in March 2018, in an anti-immigrant diatribe 
that went viral, globalization and demographic change have produced majoritarian 
anxiety: “This is more change than human beings are designed to digest. This pace 
of change makes societies volatile. Really volatile, just as ours has become 
volatile.”19 Although this kind of everyday populist anxiety might seem far from the 
concerns of copyright and cultural production, I suggest that Heymann’s paper 
forces us to risk thinking and acting boldly at the unstable threshold between the 
decolonizing desires of academic interdisciplinarity and the recolonizing forces of 
populism. 
But how would courts even begin to be a part of this broad interdisciplinary 
conversation? In conclusion, I’d like to draw by analogy from the solution Anupam 
Chander and Madhavi Sunder propose in “The Romance of the Public Domain.” 
Chander and Sunder call for the creation and nurturing of in-between spaces, 
neither fully public nor fully privatized, to get around the problem of public sphere 
appropriation of indigenous and marginalized peoples’ resources by private, for-
 
19. Michael Harriot, Tucker Carlson Explains Why White People Aren’t ‘Designed’ to Live 
Around Immigrants, ROOT (Mar. 21, 2018, 9:11 PM), https://www.theroot.com/tucker-carlson-
explains-why-white-people-arent-designed-1823973839 [https://perma.cc/32GH-42TG]. 
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profit actors. By analogy, I would point to the necessity of nurturing the “in-
between infrastructures and practices” that we need if we want to situate law within 
global interpretive communities. We need communicative infrastructures among 
scholars, activists, and policy-makers, situated all along the global axes of privilege, 
and in all the legal realms that have experienced such rapid change since the end of 
the Cold War and the economic globalization of the late twentieth century. 
How might we think about in-between infrastructures for the conversations 
Heymann wants between/among courts and communities? How should courts and 
lawmakers become practitioners of these critical historiographies and politics? What 
would it mean to belong to these communities in terms of owing certain kinds of 
engagements to activist and interpretive communities, and participating in those 
communities’ political, ethical discussions? As Heymann indicates, broadening our 
frame to consider histories of inequality may forge an unwieldy conversation with 
heavy burdens. 
Above I have drawn from examples of copyright, illegal sharing, and patent 
conflict in South Asia. I have, in this conversation, breached the technical 
parameters of the field of copying and fair use, perhaps increasing the burdens of 
this conversation, and risked losing Heymann’s focus on music, art, and cultural 
production. But, when we broaden our analytical frames, we might find that 
scholars, activists, and policy makers around the world have already begun to shape 
the conversation Heymann calls for. I hope to have indicated that there are, adjacent 
to the copyright domain, other rich fields of debate about the history and 
consequences of particular forms of cultural appropriation. Heymann’s call for a 
broader interpretive context requires, I suggest, an interdisciplinary leap whose 
burdens are high in terms of our own learning curve, but whose benefits for justice 
could be immense. 
 
